The Illinois Supreme Court recently set out to shed light on the “gray area” of the relation back doctrine, codified by 735 ILCS 5/2-616(b), through their January 08 decision in Porter v. Decatur Memorial Hosp. The original complaint in Porter alleged the hospital staff was negligent for failing to report signs of diminishing neurologic status to the neurosurgeon. After some discovery, it became clear that a radiologist failed to properly read a CT scan, and the plaintiff amended the complaint to specifically include the new allegation. The Hospital claimed that the allegation regarding the CT scan should be dismissed because it was filed after the statute of limitation had run. The plaintiff maintained that the allegation related back to the original action, and the Supreme Court agreed.
The Court regaled readers with a history of the relation-back doctrine, relying on both state and federal law. The purpose of the doctrine is to preserve causes of action against technical default unrelated to the merits of the case. Ultimately, the Court used a “sufficiently close relationship” test which allows relation-back when the new claim, compared with the timely allegations, shows that the events were close in time, close in subject matter, and led to the same injury. This, the Court believes, will give defendants sufficient notice, saving them from prejudice.
Thursday, January 31, 2008
Untried Allegation Laid to Rest with Res Judicata
Recently, Illinois Supreme Court decided Hudson v. City of Chicago. In November of 1998, 5 year old Hudson died of acute asthma exacerbation when a fire engine without advanced life support equipment was dispatched by the 911 operator. An ambulance with the correct equipment arrived nearly 15 minutes later. The plaintiff made claims against the city for negligence and willful and wanton conduct. The city, relying on immunity under the Emergency Medical Services System Act, successfully raised a motion to dismiss the negligence count with prejudice, and the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the remaining charge.
Hudson re-filed the willful and wanton count. Relying on Rein v David A. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill. 2d 325 (1996), the Court found that res judicata barred not only of every matter that was actually determined in the first suit, but also every matter which might have been brought. Therefore, based upon the adjudication on the merits of the negligence count, the willful and wanton conduct count could not stand. The Court emphasized that Rein, and subsequently Hudson, stand for anti-claim splitting policy.
Hudson re-filed the willful and wanton count. Relying on Rein v David A. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill. 2d 325 (1996), the Court found that res judicata barred not only of every matter that was actually determined in the first suit, but also every matter which might have been brought. Therefore, based upon the adjudication on the merits of the negligence count, the willful and wanton conduct count could not stand. The Court emphasized that Rein, and subsequently Hudson, stand for anti-claim splitting policy.
General Assembly is a step behind in preventing step-down provisions
Effective January 1, 2008, section 143.13a of the Illinois Insurance Code mandates that private passenger automobile liability policies must provide the same coverage limits to anyone insured under the policy, regardless of whether that person is a named insured or a permissive user. Yet the passage of this bill came too late to invalidate a hand full of Illinois Farmers Insurance “step-down” provisions which reduced policy limits to the statutory minimum for permissive users of insured vehicles. These provisions limited coverage for express or implied permissive users to $20,000 for death or injury of one person, $40,000 for death or injury of two or more persons, and $15,000 for property damage. After covering losses incurred as a result of Farmer’s step-down clauses, State Farm brought suit against Farmers for four separate incidents. State Farm claimed that the step-down clauses violated Illinois public policy, but the Appellate Court disagreed.
Armed with an amicus curiae brief from the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association, State Farm took the matter up with the Supreme Court in late September, 2007. State Farm argued that their situation was similar to other policy limit matters that had been found to run amuck of public policy including policies excluding coverage of users employed or engaged in a “car business” and car dealers denying full garage coverage to patrons test-driving vehicles. The Supreme Court did not believe those cases were on point, and instead directed attention to the clear language of the Illinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law which mandated the minimum amount of coverage for private passenger automobile liability in section 7-203. The Court did not find any intent to otherwise increase minimum coverage, so because Farmers did indeed provide that amount for permissive users, the Supreme Court upheld the step-down provisions. The Illinois General Assembly was quick in step to amend their intent, creating newly effective section 143.13a.
Armed with an amicus curiae brief from the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association, State Farm took the matter up with the Supreme Court in late September, 2007. State Farm argued that their situation was similar to other policy limit matters that had been found to run amuck of public policy including policies excluding coverage of users employed or engaged in a “car business” and car dealers denying full garage coverage to patrons test-driving vehicles. The Supreme Court did not believe those cases were on point, and instead directed attention to the clear language of the Illinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law which mandated the minimum amount of coverage for private passenger automobile liability in section 7-203. The Court did not find any intent to otherwise increase minimum coverage, so because Farmers did indeed provide that amount for permissive users, the Supreme Court upheld the step-down provisions. The Illinois General Assembly was quick in step to amend their intent, creating newly effective section 143.13a.
Court stifles cry for expansion of affirmative duties
The Supreme Court recently considered the extension of affirmative duties to act and the alleged erosion of the “special relationship” doctrine in Iseberg v. Gross. In this case, a joint business venture left one partner financially distraught and mentally unbalanced, blaming an ex-partner, the plaintiff in the case, for his plight. The two other partners were aware that the troubled partner made numerous threats on the plaintiff’s life. He later appeared at the home of the plaintiff and fired four shots, leaving the plaintiff paralyzed. Subsequently, the plaintiff claimed that the two other partners had an affirmative duty to warn him about the troubled partner’s threats. The plaintiff gave two theories for recovery: (1) a principal-agent special relationship theory, or (2) the theory that the special relationship doctrine should be abandoned entirely because it has fallen out of favor in Illinois.
The Court upheld the decision of the Appellate Court, confirming that not only was there no special relationship warranting a duty, but the special relationship doctrine still stands strong in Illinois and, for that matter, every US jurisdiction. In the decision, the Court noted that the principal-agent “special relationship” duty to warn, outlined in section 471 of the Restatement Second of Torts, is reserved for cases where there is a risk arising from the nature of a particular employment for which the principal has superior knowledge, and affirmative duties to act can only arise from a recognized “special relationship” or a statutory obligation, found in several states.
The Court upheld the decision of the Appellate Court, confirming that not only was there no special relationship warranting a duty, but the special relationship doctrine still stands strong in Illinois and, for that matter, every US jurisdiction. In the decision, the Court noted that the principal-agent “special relationship” duty to warn, outlined in section 471 of the Restatement Second of Torts, is reserved for cases where there is a risk arising from the nature of a particular employment for which the principal has superior knowledge, and affirmative duties to act can only arise from a recognized “special relationship” or a statutory obligation, found in several states.
Circuit court rule places undue burden on parties
In September 2007, a certified question was sent to the Supreme Court in Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas. The complaint alleged, among other things, violation of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, but the Court only determined whether or not a court can consider facts and circumstance of record beyond the reason for noncompliance when determining whether good cause exists under Supreme Court Rule 183 for grant of an extension of time to remedy an unintentional noncompliance with a procedural requirement. Plaintiffs had failed to file their response to defendant’s request to admit with the clerk, as was required under local rule, so the trial court deemed the requests admitted. Later, after the defendant caused numerous procedural delays and failed to comply with several court orders, the trial court reconsidered and allowed an extension for plaintiff’s response to defendant’s request to admit. The defendant challenged this reconsideration, and the Court said that discretion may be used to extend a deadline when good cause for noncompliance is shown, but that good cause could not be shown by considering facts outside of the reason for noncompliance.
However, the Court also found that the requirement to file a response to a request to admit with the clerk, as outlined in Rule 3.1(c) of the circuit court of Cook County, was an undue burden on the parties and ran contrary to Supreme Court Rule 216, which only requires that the response is served in a timely manner. This finding allowed plaintiffs an extension regardless of the adverse answer to the certified question.
However, the Court also found that the requirement to file a response to a request to admit with the clerk, as outlined in Rule 3.1(c) of the circuit court of Cook County, was an undue burden on the parties and ran contrary to Supreme Court Rule 216, which only requires that the response is served in a timely manner. This finding allowed plaintiffs an extension regardless of the adverse answer to the certified question.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)